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Abstract
While most of the literature highlights the social, economic and cultural aspects of Filipino 
migration, this study explores its political dimension by focusing on the public connection 
of Filipino elite migrants in London. Unlike other types of Filipino migrants, such as 
Americanized balikbayans and Ôlow-skilledÕ labour migrants, elite migrants are expected to 
return physically to the homeland as part of their nationalistic duty to Ôlead the nationÕ. 
From their interviews and participant observation, the authors discover that overseas 
scholars indeed maintain a strong interest in homeland political issues through heavy 
news consumption on the Internet. However, this has also fostered an ambiguous kind of 
public connection. On the one hand, elite migrants remain engaged with issues that they 
hope to address on their eventual return, but on the other hand they are not immersed with 
ÔotherÕ Filipino people in the diaspora. Their political engagement involves talk and 
mediated conversations with limited face-to-face collaborations with other migrants. This 
kind of public connection lends itself to long- distance particularistic communication and a 
great volume of discussion, but limited and short-term forms of public activity. The authors 
argue that elite migrantsÕ practices of political engagement are inscribed in continuing 
socio-historical Ð and fundamentally classed Ð divides in Philippine society. Further, rather 
than enabling cross-class communications and connections, the media are frequently used 
by elite migrants to maintain political, economic, social and cultural divides. 
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This paper investigates the mediated public connections of Filipino scholars in London. As 
elite migrants whose economic and cultural capital affords them a world of options, their 
media use might be expected to reßect their cosmopolitan character as ÔfootlooseÕ people, 
Ôon the move in the worldÕ, who Ôtend to want to immerse themselves in other 
culturesÕ (Hannerz, 1990, pp 240Ð241). As a privileged group of Filipinos who anticipate Ð 
and are expected to make Ð a victorious return to the homeland, they are routinely 
involved in practices of long-distance nationalism (Anderson, 1992), maximizing the media 
resources available to them to engage with public issues in the Philippines. But while they 
engage in mediated forms of long-distance nationalism, their actual physical encounters 
with fellow Filipinos in public political events is limited. 
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Exploring the connections and contradictions between elite migrant experiences and forms 
of mediated public connection, we draw on and contribute critically to two existing Þelds of 
study. First, this paper enriches debates about Philippine migration by foregrounding the 
importance of mediated politics in the migrant experience. Most studies on Philippine 
migration have tended to focus on its other aspects, such as its social costs (Aguilar, 2010; 
Dungo, 2008; Parreas, 2005), economic implications (Aldaba, 2001; Asis, 2006; Porio, 
2007) and cultural consequences (Amrith, 2010; Johnson, 2010). Those works that do 
consider the role of the media in Philippine migration typically engage with issues of 
performing cultural identity (Cabaes, 2009; Ignacio, 2005; Ong, 2009) and maintaining 
long-distance relation- ships (Madianou and Miller, this issue; Uy-Tioco, 2007). Although 
these are important issues to consider, we argue that the issue of political engagement 
should not be set aside. 
Here we consider the role of media in facilitating migrantsÕ political engagements. This is 
especially salient in the case of migrant Filipino scholars who have had a particularly 
storied history with mediated politics. One of the earliest groups of migrants from the 
Spanish-colonized Philippine Islands constituted scholars who travelled to be educated in 
the cosmopolitan cities of Europe, such as Madrid, Berlin and Paris in the late nineteenth 
century. Known as ilustrados [enlightened ones] Ð this group of young men from the 
landed elite class included Jose Rizal, Juan Luna and Gregorio del Pilar.1 Many of them 
would later on be commemorated as heroes of the country because they were 
instrumental in constructing the idea of a Filipino nation (Aguilar, 2005; Cullinane, 2003; 
Reyes, 2008). While printed periodicals of the time kept them connected to their 
homeland, they also became producers of various propaganda materials to campaign for Ð 
initially Ð recognition as Spanish citizens and, subsequently, independence as Filipino 
people (Anderson, 1991; Rafael, 1990). Today the notion that migrant Filipino scholars 
have an especially political role is still played out through the media. There are incessant 
news items calling upon them to return and lead in rebuilding a fallen nation that was once 
the most esteemed country in South East Asia (Lapea, 2010; Villafania, 2009). 
The second aim of this paper is to extend the notion of mediated public connection by 
situating it in a transnational context. Thus far, most of the public connection debate draws 
on empirical work focused on individuals living within their countries of birth and assumes 
that there is only one public sphere to orient towards (Couldry and Langer, 2005; Couldry 
et al, 2007; Dahlgren and Olsson, 2008). This is, of course, inapplicable to most migrants, 
who routinely negotiate ties with both the homeland and the host country (Clifford, 1994; 
Cohen, 1997; Vertovec, 1999). To be sure, there are media and migration studies that take 
due consideration of this ambivalence, such as those ethnographic studies of migrant 
news consumption (for example, Alghasi, 2009; Gillespie, 1995; Madianou, 2005) and 
empirical works on the mediated politics of the diaspora (for example, Aouragh, 2008; Fogt 
and Sandvik, 2008; Matar, 2006). However, the primary focus of these studies is on 
identity performances and identity politics and does not address the central questions of a 
public connection framework. By insisting that the concept of mediated public connection 
accounts for the migrant experience of multiple belongings and multiple public spheres, we 
move it away from its tendency for methodological nationalism and towards the more 
transnational stance of media and migration studies. 
In sum, this paper emphasizes the necessity of investigating mediated politics in Philippine 
migration studies, and the importance of bringing a transnational perspective to bear in 
studies of political engagement. In the case of the Filipino overseas scholars in London 
considered here, we reveal that their mediated public connection is informed by socio-
historical understandings and practices of nationalism and political engagement in the 
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Philippines. SpeciÞcally, we argue that in this context, their practices of engaging with 
homeland political issues while disengaging with ÔotherÕ Filipino people are embedded in, 
and potentially amplify, long-existing class divides in Philippine society. 
Public connection in the context of Filipino migration 
For this study, we draw on the seminal work of Nick Couldry, Sonia Livingstone and Tim 
Markham (2007) to deÞne public connection. According to them, this concept refers less to 
a sustained attention and more to a basic orientation Ð actually a spectrum of engagement 
and disengagement Ð towards a public world where public issues should be confronted. 
Equally important, they posit that the media may play a crucial role both in enabling and 
disabling this connection. In that way, they avoid the extreme pessimism that characterizes 
PutnamÕs (2000) indictment of television as the primary culprit for civic disengagement in 
the USA and Cappella and JamiesonÕs (1997) claim that negative press coverage is a 
signiÞcant factor in growing cynicism and apathy among Americans. At the same time, it 
also avoids the opposite extreme of being overly celebratory, as in Dayan and KatzÕs 
(1992) insistence that the broadcasting of special rituals that interrupt daily programming 
has the power to cohere audiences as a single public, and more recently Shah et alÕs 
(2005) assertion that the Internet enables collective action that is transcendent of the 
temporal and spatial considerations that constrain face-to-face communication. In place of 
such media deterministic approaches, Couldry et al (2007), drawing on DahlgrenÕs (2005) 
civic culture framework, situate the relationship between media and public connection in 
the context of peopleÕs everyday lives. 
It is unfortunate that there are no previous studies that closely examine how the media 
matter in the public connection of Filipino migrants. However, there are works that we can 
draw on to help us tease out the kind of orientation they have towards their homeland and 
their host country. But with 10% of the approximately 90 million Philippine population 
scattered all over the world (Nayan, 2009), their experiences will necessarily be very 
diverse. That diversity is evident in the reactions to a YouTube viral video of Economics 
Professor Solita MonsodÕs Ôlast lectureÕ. In it, Monsod admonishes her students at the 
University of the Philippines not to turn their backs on their country by leaving it, and 
worse, never returning. In one of her most rousing lines, she says, 
ÔIf you are going to help this country, youÕve got to be in the country. If any of you 
have little ambitions of going abroad so that you can earn more, please disabuse 
yourself, because by doing that you are essentially betraying the people in the 
Philippines who trusted you and who invested their money in you.Õ (Lapea, 2010) 
One very angry retort to this was written by a FilipinoÐAmerican physician, Joy de 
Mercaida (2010). She asks, 
ÔHow am I a traitor when the dollars I earn here translate into businesses and 
consumer conÞdence and local spending by the family and people I still support 
back home? How is it that I am a fool when I have wrought only respect and 
admiration and love in [the USA] for a Filipino?Õ 
And then there were the many Overseas Filipino Workers (OFWs) who made their 
disagreement with Monsod clear by emphasizing how much they give back to and sacriÞce 
for the country. In an article at Spot.ph that reports on the Monsod video, there are posts 
such as: 
Rachel: Ôpero [but] the Philppine economy is propped by OFW moneyÕ. 
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Bida: Ôas an OFW, I cannot allow this one opinion of hers to render useless my 
choices in life . . . I have to be away from my kid while I do my bit in helping keep 
the Philippine economy out of the red.Õ 
What is interesting about these comments is that their writers assumed that Monsod had 
referred to them, when really, her speech was speciÞcally directed towards scholars Ð 
those whom she especially addresses as the countryÕs Ôcrme de la crmeÕ Ð those who 
were still torn between staying and migrating. She, in fact, did not articulate anything about 
Filipinos who had already chosen to reside permanently or work temporarily abroad. 
These cases appear to be illustrative of ÔmisrecognitionÕ (Bourdieu, 1977), as migrants 
misread their class positions due to social forces that mask signiÞcant differences and 
inequalities. This is perhaps because, in both popular and academic discourse, there has 
been a tendency to homogenize Filipino migrants. It is crucial then that we have a more 
nuanced view of their different experiences. We thus provide a heuristic division of the 
Filipino migrant condition in relation to the notion of public connection. 
The balikbayans 
There are those, like Dr de Marcaida above, whom we will refer to as the balikbayans. 
Here we deÞne this category in historical terms. For this, we turn to the Philippine scholar 
Vicente Rafael (1997, p 206) and his depiction of this group: 
ÔIt was the Marcos regime in the mid-1970s that coined the term balikbayan to 
describe immigrant Filipinos primarily from North America who periodically visit the 
motherland. The term joins the Tagalog words balik [to return] and bayan [town, 
and at least from the late nineteenth century on, nation]. As a balikbayan, oneÕs 
relationship to the Philippines is construed in terms of oneÕs sentimental 
attachments to oneÕs hometown and extended family rather than oneÕs loyalty to 
the nation-state. At the same time, being a balikbayan depends on oneÕs 
permanent residence abroad. It means that one lives somewhere else and that 
oneÕs appearance in the Philippines is temporary and intermittent, as if one were a 
tourist.Õ 
He goes on to explain how Filipino nationalists tend to deride this group for their overt 
preference for the USA. Often, they are caricatured as coming home only to complain 
about how backward everything is in the Philippines and, at the same time, to proselytize 
about how superior everything is in the land of the ÔAmerican dreamÕ. 
Despite keeping very strong personal and emotional ties to the home- land then, they 
generally consider themselves expatriated. Their primary concern is no longer how to 
intervene in Philippine politics, but how to create FilipinoÐAmerican spaces within the 
American political system; they are less about Þxing the homeland and more about Þxing 
their new home away from home (Bonus, 2000; Ignacio, 2005). Knowing this, what the 
Philippine nation-state usually expects to get out of them are their dole-outs to the people 
still stuck back home and the tourist money they spend during their occasional visits 
(Rafael, 1997). In light of these, it can be argued that the public connection of balikbayans 
is Þrmly directed towards their host country, namely the USA. 
The OFWs 
Although many migrant Filipinos desire to be balikbayans themselves, the majority are, like 
Rachel and Bida above, in everyday and ofÞcial discourse commonly considered to be 
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overseas Filipino workers Ð OFWs (Nayan, 2009). Most OFWs are employed either in care 
and domestic work or in factory and construction work. These occupations, along with 
seafaring, are routinely and respectively associated with migrant Filipino women and men. 
As a testament to how much money and goods they put into the Philippine economy, the 
Philippine government has ofÞcially recognized them as mga bagong bayani [modern-day 
heroes]. As the then-President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo proclaimed in the 2001 Bagong 
Bayani Awards ceremonies, 
ÔOverseas Workers [are] contributors to the national economy . . . In several instances 
when the economy had a foreign exchange crisis, the consistent dollar inßows from our 
[OFWs] saved the economy from collapsing. But beyond the billions of dollars in 
remittances which have built homes, sent children to school, and started small businesses, 
the Bagong Bayani Award acknowledges the [OFWsÕ] efforts to keep alive the Filipino 
values and promote our sense of nationhood wherever they may be.Õ (cited in Cabaes, 
2009, pp 179Ð 180) 
Although the government might want to conßate OFWsÕ remittances with strong loyalty to 
the nation-state, this is not necessarily the reality. Like their balikbayan counterparts, 
migrant Filipino workersÕ connec- tions with and talk about return frequently focus on 
attachments to locality and the embrace of their kinship network (McKay, 2005). Some 
view the state as Ôa corrupt exploiter, not representative of the masses, a comprador agent 
of transnational corporations and Western (speciÞcally US) powersÕ (San Juan, 2000, p 
236). Though many are resident for long periods abroad and may develop complex 
relation- ships with the people and places among whom and in which they live and work 
(Johnson and Werbner, 2010), they frequently do not think about staying permanently in 
their host countries because they are often accorded at best partial citizenship (Parreas, 
2001). 
It seems then that both the homeland and the host countries of OFWs have a primarily 
instrumental relationship with them. For the latter, their primary value abroad is as cheap 
labour, while for the former it is as export material and a source of external revenue. Their 
bodies are to stay overseas, where they can best contribute by sending back money and 
goods to the home country. And their bodies will only come home in moments of defeat, as 
exempliÞed by the harrowing statistic that Þve cofÞns carrying dead bodies of OFWs arrive 
every day Ð their deaths a result of sometimes inhumane treatment abroad (San Juan, 
2000). It is that situation that conditions and constrains the forms of public engagement 
among OFWs in the homeland and host country respectively. 
The elite migrants 
Few as they are, there are some Filipino migrants who are deemed more fortunate than 
their OFW counterparts. DeÞned as elites, they are often characterized as people, 
Ôwho [are] traveled and who [wear] the knowledge gained from [their] travels 
lightly . . . they are always aware that there are other worlds which they could also, 
and will in all probability at some time later, be a part of.Õ (Latham, 2006, p 94) 
These comprise not only scholars, but also highly skilled professionals, such as doctors, 
accountants and IT workers (for example, Cabaes, 2009; Ong, 2009). In the speciÞc case 
of migrant scholars, the call of the homeland and the host country are both very strong: 
capable of taking advantage of global opportunities, there is also a strong nationalistic call 
for them to return and help their country. This experience holds true for many scholars 
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from the developing world, such as Ghana (Goethe and Hillman, 2008) and the Caribbean 
countries (Potter and Conway, 2008). In the speciÞc case of Filipino migrant scholars 
considered here, they contend with two distinct discourses. 
On the one hand, there is a strong moralistic undercurrent to the calls for migrant scholars 
to prove their nationalism by coming home. Just as the ilustrados of the past are 
remembered for sparking the revolution of the colonial Philippines against Spain (Aguilar, 
2005), so are the foreign-educated Filipinos of today expected to bring about a 
socioeconomic revolution in the country. For instance, Senator Edgardo Angara, head of 
the Congressional Committee on Science, Technology and Engineering (COMSTE), sent 
out an impassioned plea to Filipino scholars to return and raise the quality of local 
academia and the productivity of local industry (Villafania, 2009). To be sure, there are 
quite a number of academics and technocrats who have heeded such requests, having 
gone back home to help push the national economy out of its decades-long stagnation 
(Pinches, 1996). 
On the other hand, there is the long-standing belief that a foreign degree offers one an 
escape from the hard life back home. The opinion columnist Conrado de Quiros (2009) 
accurately describes this discourse: ÔThe notion of someone who took an MA or Ph.D. in 
an American university coming home to teach in [the University of the Philippines] or some 
other school is regarded as an act of insanity. Despite the desolate landscape of the US 
today . . . we still think our compatriots are lucky to be there.Õ There are many who no 
longer return: hence the panic about the Ôbrain drainÕ phenomenon (Palatino, 2007). 
Unlike the balikbayans who have settled permanently in host countries, migrant Filipino 
scholars still seem eager to consider the clamour for them to return and be heroes for the 
homeland. Unlike many migrant workers, they have a chance to attain a life of comfort and 
security in their host country, to become balikbayans. Because of these contradictory 
obligations and opportunities, it is not as easy to discern the kind of public connection that 
these elite migrants have. To see how those contradictions are resolved and to see how 
the media play a role in that, we turn now to data gathered from a series of ethnographic 
interviews and observation of 10 London-based Filipino scholars2 from December 2006 to 
March 2007, as well as some follow-up interviews with them in September 2009 and 
October 2010. 
Media-savvy information-seekers 
Any inquiry into public connection needs to start with issues of access and availability of 
media. While it might be easy to assume that the ÔeliteÕ status of these migrants affords 
them limitless options when it comes to their choice of media, their stories reveal 
constraints in the sense of having overall fewer media that they could access, or afford, in 
their sojourn to London. And, due to time and (for some) budget constraints, many 
adjusted their media habits and became more selective and purposive in which media 
technologies and content they consumed. Twenty-eight-year-old Trina says, 
ÔIn the past, the TV is just there, switched on, I donÕt really care. The 
newspaper . . . just lies there. Then when I drive to work, I turn the radio on. . . But 
here, I have to make an effort to be informed.Õ (Trina, MA, Geography) 
Trina here is comparing her experiences with media usage before and after her sojourn in 
London. As a project manager in a non-governmental organization that focuses on energy 
conservation, she relates the necessity to keep up with the news to part of her job training 
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as well as an old habit picked up from her days as a student leader. In London, however, 
she says that she has become Ôutterly deprivedÕ of media. While such a statement comes 
across as slightly hyperbolic Ð Trina came to the interview toting a Blackberry, a Motorola 
RAZR, a 13-inch laptop, an iPod, a geography textbook, and what looked like the sports 
section of a UK newspaper Ð her ÔdeprivationÕ appears genuinely troubling and unfamiliar 
to her. Of course, this personal feeling of media deprivation is in stark contrast to the social 
reality of London as the hub of media and creative industries in Europe: Trina herself 
admits to being impressed with the way in which free dailies are generously handed out at 
bus stops and tube stations, how thick and wordy UK newspapers are, compared with 
newspapers back home, and how smart and informative BBC news and documentaries 
are. But for her, and for most of our respondents, this feeling of deprivation was undeniably 
rooted in the limited choices that they had had with homeland-oriented news platforms 
since their arrival. From an experience of Filipino news simply being ÔenvironmentalÕ to a 
context in which they had to seek Filipino-oriented media content actively and creatively in 
a foreign land, these elite migrants talk about the signiÞcance of adjusting to this new 
media environment as no less important than adjusting to the weather, or to the food, or to 
the many different English accents. 
Their mobile computers then become their primary media platform. Through their laptops, 
they access the world wide web, spending upwards of Þve hours a day on the web for both 
ÔpersonalÕ and ÔworkÕ reasons. And when it comes to political engagement, as we discuss 
in the next sections, they use the Internet to seek political news and information and 
discuss public issues on various social networking sites, online forums and mailing lists. 
When we met Jonsy, a 24-year-old MasterÕs student in political sociology, he was 
enthusiastic to tell us about his Ôsearching powersÕ on the web. Chatting over coffee at a 
Starbucks in North London, he pulled out his laptop to show us which words to type into 
Google and YouTube and which websites to visit in order to access at no cost clips and 
entire episodes of Filipino TV shows. ÔI donÕt have money to buy a TV, I have no place for a 
TV in my dorm, I donÕt have money to pay 100 pounds for a stupid TV licence, and I 
certainly donÕt have money for [a subscription to] The Filipino Channel. So this is what I 
do!Õ Jonsy had apparently found a way to watch his favourite Filipino talk shows and 
newscasts by accessing a YouTube userÕs (illegal) uploads of ABS- CBN programmes, 
and he was eager to share his discovery with any other Filipino who might be interested. In 
fact, during our interviews, we observed how our respondents seemed especially proud to 
show off their ability to access illegal and hidden Filipino content online. Such displays of 
interest and knowledge about the homeland sound thoroughly different from the 
Americanized balikbayans described by Rafael (1997) and de Quiros (2009) as 
desperately distancing themselves from their native country. 
The media consumption of our respondents indicates a public connection oriented towards 
the homeland rather than the host country, challenging assumptions that elite migrants 
become cosmopolitanized during their travels and detach themselves from their roots 
(Latham, 2006). But is this interest in Philippine issues really a display of nationalism, or is 
it something else? And is this a function of the media that they consume, or does it have 
more to do with their experiences as overseas students? 
In probing their evaluations of Philippine media, particularly Philippine news, we actually 
came to hear very pointed critiques of their content and style, with consistent references to 
ÔsuperiorÕ British and international news coverage of politics. ÔSimplisticÕ, ÔbiasedÕ and 
ÔincompleteÕ were some of the adjectives used to describe Philippine news and public 
affairs programmes. One respondent even recounted being stunned by, and subsequently 
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feeling jealous of, the BBC programme Question Time. Jenny reßected, ÔWhy couldnÕt we 
have programmes like that back home? If only we could grill our candidates in a 
straightforward, sensible way like the British can!Õ Talking about the coverage of the 
Philippine elections, Jenny seemed deeply concerned about how media coverage of 
politics in the Philippines may forever remain personality- rather than issue-oriented. 
However, while they expressed admiration and respect for the UK mediaÕs coverage of 
political issues, we discovered that this did not translate into higher interest in British 
politics. ÔHonestly, I donÕt give a damnÕ was the succinct response of Miko to our question 
as to whether he was interested in British and international political issues. And although 
we had respondents who were in fact interested in British and international political issues, 
our interviews with them revealed that they had already been interested in international 
issues even before their departure for London. Their media consumption in London only 
served to reinforce their previous interests, but did not in fact spark (or cosmopolitanize) 
them. 
It seems then, for our respondents, their interests in political issues have not signiÞcantly 
changed since their sojourn. The majority of our respondents are still interested in 
Philippine politics, particularly in news about the elections, corruption scandals and issues 
of governance. In fact, they have become even more conscious of the need to keep in 
touch with homeland news as they have actively had to seek out content on the Internet. 
Whereas before they could incidentally over- hear or absorb political news in a media 
environment that directed them to the Philippine public sphere, now they had to search for 
alternative platforms to sustain this public connection. It appears that the quantity and 
quality of the media content only reinforce the pre-existing orientation of their public 
connection rather than radically transform it. So what might explain elite migrantsÕ 
continued focus on homeland politics? 
Explaining their homeland orientation 
Nationalism as a moral duty 
As mentioned earlier, there is a special set of concerns and expectations around educated 
Filipino youth. While Filipinos recognize the great need for their countrymen and women to 
move abroad and earn a living for themselves and their families, among educated youth 
there is a particular hope that they will choose to stay in Ð or at least return to Ð the 
Philippines so that they can institute much-needed changes in their respective universities, 
companies, industries or in the government. We were curious to see how our respondents 
related to this. 
ÔWell, I know a lot of things are wrong in our country . . . I was involved in some 
activist organizations [at the University of the Philippines] so I did my share back 
home. Here IÕm not yet sure whatÕs going to happen. But yes, I want to give back 
to my country eventually. ItÕs kind of like our debt too.Õ (Grace, MBA) 
ÔI donÕt know about you, but [returning] has always been the plan. IÕll be going 
home to Palawan to run for [public ofÞce] . . . I feel that I could apply what I learn 
here and help the people in my province start small businesses. Then they could 
sustain themselves and become more independent [from corrupt 
politicians].Õ (Horacio, MA, Development Studies) 
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Respondents explicitly drew on the notion of ÔreturnÕ and Ôgiving backÕ. Most echoed the 
mainstream rhetoric and expressed ÔreturnÕ and Ôgiving backÕ in moral terms. To shun 
opportunities to earn in pounds and dollars abroad and work in prestigious international 
organizations in favour of working at home is described by our informants as a ÔdutyÕ, a 
ÔsacriÞceÕ, even a fulÞlment of a debt or obligation to the country. They express awareness 
(and shame) that the country once boasted the most promising economy in Asia, but that 
since the 1970s has become the Ôsick man of AsiaÕ, lagging behind almost all of its 
neighbouring countries (Jose, 2005; Kind, 2000). They convey both acceptance and 
idealism in the claim that they themselves carry the burden of responsibility to help solve 
social problems and, more signiÞcantly, that they could actually fulÞl this responsibility in 
the near future. Although they did not attribute blame to Filipinos who leave the country to 
work as domestic workers or nurses, they are harsher towards migrants who leave as 
doctors, engineers and other professionals: ÔThatÕs just sad. Understandable but sad. If all 
the good people leave, then who is left? I feel like these people are quitters. TheyÕre just 
giving up.Õ They sometimes referred to fellow Filipino ÔeliteÕ colleagues who had gone to the 
USA but never returned to the Philippines as people they did not wish to emulate. 
Like Horacio above, many of the elite migrants we met stressed the signiÞcance of 
education in helping to address the countryÕs social, political and economic problems. 
There is a shared belief in the transformative value of ideas. SpeciÞcally, they relate how 
their academic studies and learning experiences outside the classroom in the UK Ôopened 
their eyesÕ, even Ôchanged their lives foreverÕ. In our inter- views, elite migrants shared the 
hope that these life-changing ideas would be equally life-changing to others once they 
shared them with their compatriots back home. And as with Horacio, there is a shared 
desire to experiment and introduce new ideas and best practices from the West to their 
local communities or companies back home. 
ÔThe problem with the people who run our government back home is that they 
have no experience what itÕs like in other countries. They become so complacent, 
theyÕre treated like gods, theyÕre not used to being challenged!Õ (Lulu, MSc, 
Information Systems) 
ÔLook! Here in the West, they welcome debate and argumentation [in public 
issues]. I hate how the Church [back home] controls the government [in the issue 
of reproductive health and contraception]. Here that is simply unacceptable. 
Argument from authority is a fallacy. ItÕs medieval!Õ (Kara, MA, Social Work) 
The responses that we have seen in this section are not simply articulations of personal 
moral codes, duties or ambitions; they are also expressions of shared social 
understandings, meanings and expectations. In their expressions of desires and ambitions 
for themselves, there are also underlying judgments about their own peers and also other 
Filipinos back home. In fashioning themselves as future leaders of the country, there is an 
unspoken statement that people back home would be better off as followers. In 
underscoring the value of education and ideas Ð intellectual capital that they have 
accumulated in their studies Ð they assume that thinkers (the intellectual elite) are the 
better leaders in society, just as others with less intellectual capital are better ÔdoersÕ or 
ÔworkersÕ. In being hopeful about the future and their contributions to such a future, they 
reveal negativity about the present and a value judgment of backwardness and ineptitude 
in the current establishment. And for a few, their valuation of knowledge derived from the 
West is indicative of their own Orientalist dichotomies of West/ East, modern/pre-modern 
and progressive/regressive. Nevertheless, it is signiÞcant to stress that these elite 
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migrantsÕ expression of moral duties is infused with a sense of youthful idealism and a 
genuine desire to ÔhelpÕ, even ÔsaveÕ an eternally ÔdevelopingÕ Third World country. 
Investments and opportunities 
When probed further as to why their public connection remains unwavering towards the 
homeland, other reasons aside from the moral come up. In particular, it seems that for 
these elite migrants, highly attractive political and economic opportunities remain available 
for them at home. We have two stories to share. 
First, there is David, an urban planning student. His family owns a real-estate business in 
Manila, and he is expected to run the company with his sister in the future. Back home, 
David was responsible for the new business division of their company. He pays attention to 
Philippine news Ôevery nightÕ. He is anxious about political turmoil or natural disaster, as 
this would affect their business. Self-funded as a MasterÕs student, he claims he is Ôalmost 
100% sureÕ of returning home. 
Second, we have Miko, a development studies student from Bohol on an academic 
scholarship. Since graduating from university with honours, he has worked for an NGO in 
Cebu. While he is keeping his eye out for opportunities in prestigious London-based 
NGOs, he expects that he will eventually return to Bohol. ÔI donÕt want to abandon my 
friends who are counting on me,Õ he says. ÔThough IÕm sure the pay here would probably 
be four times the peanuts I make back home.Õ 
While their backgrounds could not be more different, at least if we follow PinchesÕs (1996) 
ethnographic descriptions of Ôold richÕ and Ônew richÕ communities in the Philippines, both 
David and Miko share some key similarities. First, unlike the majority of Filipino migrants 
who venture abroad in pursuit of economic opportunities absent at home, David and Miko 
already enjoy comfortable lives back home. While between the two there are still great 
disparities Ð with David earning substantially more from the real-estate business than Miko 
the social worker-cum-academic Ð nevertheless, both possess ÔeliteÕ status in their own 
Þelds. David, as part of ManilaÕs Ôold richÕ, has high economic capital, just as MikoÕs 
prestigious academic scholarship lends him more intellectual and symbolic capital. Their 
sojourn abroad then was not about gaining new status for themselves (as labour migrants 
attempt to accomplish) Ð rather, theirs was about consolidating already existing status 
back home, at least in their particular Þelds. The sojourn abroad was not about a 
pagbabakasakali or Ôtaking a leap of faithÕ, as OFWs have been known to narrate (Rafael, 
2000) Ð theirs, in contrast, was a more proactive pagsunggab sa pagkakataon or Ôseizing 
the opportunityÕ. While the OFW discourse of departure is inßected with the theme of risk, 
the elite migrant discourse is about opportunity, available and attractive at home or abroad. 
David and Miko have much invested back home Ð in their careers, their peers, their family. 
So, unsurprisingly, there is much invested in their return. On their return, they are expected 
to take leadership positions, share skills and knowledge, and institute changes that people 
perceive no one else could make but them. And (quite signiÞcantly), on their return, they 
themselves believe that they will have acquired the resources necessary to face their 
responsibilities. In this way, we argue that these London-based students have a high 
degree of self-efÞcacy that overpowers whatever low trust that they may have in current 
institutions. This high self-efÞcacy, coupled with a sense of youthful idealism, translates 
into a conviction that, having invested time, effort and (for some) money in their studies 
abroad, they will be able to make right what is wrong in the homeland. 
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Alienation and exclusion in the UK 
Another reason behind this homeland-directed public connection may pertain to feelings of 
alienation, rejection and exclusion that some of these elite migrants sometimes experience 
in the UK. Only two out of 10 respondents mention having family or other relatives in the 
UK. This is radically different from the US context, where Filipinos have long established a 
wide network of family ties (Dia, 2003) to whom they could turn for companionship and 
care. Some of our respondents also mention various experiences of ÔdiscriminationÕ: they 
disdain the way in which classmates register surprise about how well they speak English 
(ÔThey thought I was from mainland China! They had no idea where the Philippines is!Õ), 
how new acquaintances immediately assume they work in a care home or hospital 
(ÔExcuse me!Õ) and even how they are ignored by people when they go clubbing (ÔI think 
the Brits just dislike Malay-looking people. TheyÕve gotten used to Indians, but not to us, I 
guess.Õ) What this clearly illustrates is that elite migrants, while subscribing to popular 
moral discourses about their duty to ÔreturnÕ, sometimes elide other reasons for their 
continued public connection to the homeland. 
The media are clearly implicated in maintaining this public connection to the homeland. 
First, homeland news is used as a political resource for them to maintain a belief in 
themselves as active agents in Philippine society. Homeland news platforms become 
instruments Ð and news content the resources Ð that enable them to make decisions for 
themselves and others. At the same time, through social networking sites, messages 
boards and mailing lists, we see these elite migrants testing the waters by expressing the 
ideas they have learned in school, making new connections and publicizing their work and 
achievements. In displaying their social, cultural and intellectual capital in these online 
spaces, we see attempts to build and establish a name for themselves in their respective 
industries and communities, and perhaps to acquire supporters and followers to help with 
their causes. 
The proper distance for political engagement 
Having explained the direction of their public connection and the various reasons that 
inßuence this, we now discuss the quality of this public connection and their actual 
activities of political engagement. Following the public connection model, we asked our 
respondents about their political practices past and present Ð from writing Ôletters to the 
editorÕ to attending rallies to joining organized groups Ð and the frequency of their 
participation. For a majority of our respondents, the activities that they enumerated were 
highly interpersonal, rather than formal or organizational, in nature: discussing political 
news with friends, commenting on news articles online, forwarding petitions via e-mail, 
posting a topic in the Pinoy-UK mailing list, etc. While four out of ten respondents 
mentioned physically going to EDSA to protest about the ouster of Philippine President 
Joseph Estrada in January 2001, activities such as joining organizations or visiting 
community centres were rarely mentioned, and when they were, they were negatively 
evaluated, especially in the UK context. 
ÔThose types of activities are hit-and-miss. And theyÕre usually a miss. You never 
know who youÕll meet, and theyÕll probably just waste your time.Õ (Jonsy, MA, 
Political Sociology) 
ÔIÕm always scared to go. [laughs] If the [Filipino students] you meet in the 
[Philippine Embassy] Christmas party are any indication, then youÕll only go home 
from these seminars with a very bad headache.Õ (Jenny, MSc, Public Health) 
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ÔThere was a seminar I attended at SOAS about Campaign for Human Rights in 
the Philippines with Congressman Satur Ocampo. IÕm passionate about the issue 
for a while now. But you know, ah, itÕs hard to attend if youÕre going by yourself. . . 
When I go to events, I always have a buddy with me. That way, you always have 
an escape! [play-acts] ÒJonathan! Look at the time! LetÕs go!ÓÕ (Arlen, MA, Media 
Studies) 
For the students we interviewed, political events are perhaps Þrst and foremost perceived 
as social events. And as social events, they carry a curious kind of risk in that you never 
know who youÕll meet at such functions. Our respondents express wariness of the 
possibility of inter- acting with participants with whom they have very little in common, even 
if they ostensibly share the experience of being among the few hundred Filipino students, 
on top of the more than 200,000 Filipinos living and working in the UK (Johnson and 
McKay, this issue). 
This concern with the social highlights the peculiarity of the diasporic experience. In 
diaspora, social boundaries are transgressed and new ones are erected: people meet 
people they would otherwise never meet, and people meet people in contexts wholly 
unfamiliar. ÔOld richÕ meet Ônew richÕ, scholars meet sons of scions, leftists meet rightists, 
businessmen meet nurses, young meet old, on a supposedly ÔlevelÕ playing Þeld, as 
everyone is back to being a student. This levelling-off or erasing of previous status 
differentiators is an illusion, as new conÞgurations of power and new rules of engagement 
emerge Ð giving rise to feelings of anxiety and uncertainty in socializing with other 
Filipinos. 
Several of our respondents, for instance, recount their annoyance at how Chevening 
scholars3 display a Ôsuperiority complexÕ. As Joyce remarks, ÔJust because theyÕre 
Chevening, they feel that they can talk down to me. When they ask my course and I say 
Ôpublic healthÕ they think IÕm, you know, OFW-nurse. IÕm a scholar too!Õ4 It appears that an 
unusual new hierarchy is enforced in some student gatherings, where the self-funded 
economic elite move down the food chain while the intellectual elite are accorded more 
symbolic capital. 
Social class conßicts re-emerge too in Ônew richÕÐÔold richÕ interactions in the diaspora. 
Here we have Jericho, a politics student with ambitions to run for congressman. Self-
conÞdent and opinionated, Jericho surprised us when he started conÞding in us about his 
negative experiences of ÔnetworkingÕ with other Filipino students in the UK. All this time, we 
had pegged Jericho as part of ManilaÕs elite society, judging from his diploma at a UK 
boarding school, his apartment in Knightsbridge, and his family resort outside Metro 
Manila. This is his story: 
ÔI attended this Filipino human rights event. During the tea break, I approached this 
daughter of a Filipino senator, hoping to discuss politics with her. Who knows what 
that might lead to, right? So we got us talking for a while, and then she asked me 
for my last name. Can you believe that her reply was, ÒHmm, I havenÕt heard of 
thatÓ? All I could muster back was, ÒMe neitherÓ.Õ 
Such experiences of boundary-raising in face-to-face contexts, both recreational (such as 
a studentsÕ Christmas party) and political (such as seminars with opposition-party 
politicians), seem to impact upon the kinds of political activities in which elite migrants 
participate. Elite migrants become wary of activities that involve prolonged, deep inter- 
actions with other Filipino elite migrants. A few respondents even mention that, at times, 
!12
they prefer to befriend Filipino domestic workers; it appears there is less need to assert 
status with OFWs as compared with other Filipino students and professionals. 
Wary of fellow elitesÕ unpredictable backgrounds and behaviours as well as the 
reconÞgured contexts of interaction in the diaspora, students then seek to establish an 
engagement with homeland politics from a Ôproper distanceÕ: close to issues but far from 
other people. This explains their great knowledge of issues, high volume of talk and 
discussion, but limited action in the form (and formalities) of organizing and rallying. 
Through the course of our Þeldwork, we were indeed surprised how much of Filipino 
interaction in the diaspora is inßected with rituals of Ôsizing upÕ the other, as Fenella 
Cannell (1999) witnessed among a community of poor people in Bicol Ð a context 
seemingly very far removed from that of elite migrants in London. Cannell observed how 
poor peopleÕs everyday interactions with others were occasions when they attempted to 
transform their conditions by Þnding potential patrons they could depend on in times of 
need. In this case, sizing-up rituals are not motivated by a desire to forge cross-class 
connections that might beneÞt oneÕs condition; they are driven more by a desire to forge 
connections within the same class groupings. Given that they all possess a high level of 
self-efÞcacy, not to mention self-esteem, being dismissed by ÔpeersÕ, as in JerichoÕs case, 
is a difÞcult pill to swallow, as they have been used to being treated with respect and 
authority back home. Back home at least, spaces for social and political interaction are 
more rigidly monitored, and the chances that ÔoutsidersÕ will penetrate these boundaries 
are much more minimal. As a result, political engage- ment Ð and political socializing Ð are 
preferably practised from a safe and proper distance, where there is limited long-term 
commitment, with an escape plan always already in place. 
The media then become signiÞcant to their story. As mentioned, there is much blogging, e-
mailing, forwarding Ð and more recently, Tweeting and Facebooking. E-mail groups and 
social networking websites provide these students with relatively safe venues for 
interaction where the boundaries of page and screen provide a defence against the 
unpredictable socialities of the face-to-face. 
For example, there was Jenny who talked about being a regular reader of posts in the 
Pinoy-UK mailing list, a mailing list for UK-based Filipino students. Jenny articulated two 
primary ways in which online discussion platforms were productive. First, she found that 
the website links and commentaries posted by other students on these sites were useful 
when reßecting on her own stand on thorny political issues. And second, she found that 
mailing lists and Facebook groups were helpful in tracking which issues people generally 
held to be important. 
But while such spaces are good resources for learning about political issues, Jenny and 
others still had a low regard for the quality of political interactions on these platforms. 
Some of our respondents cite how fellow elite migrants often argue in moralistic rather 
than rational ways, and others share the fact that instead of correctly ÔreferencingÕ their 
arguments, people choose to Ôname-dropÕ the family names of powerful people they know 
in order to be accorded respect in online forums. Quite a few also deride not only their 
fellow elite migrantsÕ online discussions, but also the mediated talk of Filipinos more 
generally. An illustrative example is the shared fear and disdain for jejemon users that they 
felt to be ÔinvadingÕ Facebook and Twitter. Jejemon is a recently invented popular term that 
refers to Filipinos who ÔmisuseÕ (and abuse) the English language in mediated 
communications. Instead of spelling ÔheheÕ to denote laughter, these users instead type 
ÔjejejeÕ playfully derived from Spanish, and are described by fellow users as 
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ÔmonstersÕ (hence jeje-mon). But as Rolando Tolentino (2010) astutely points out, this 
naming and shaming of jejemons is not only a battle for the ÔproperÕ use of the English 
language, but is fundamentally reßective of class conßict, given that jejemon language is 
the popular, ÔcoolÕ practice of young lower-income Filipinos.5 Elite migrants explain how 
jejemons misbehave online: they supposedly post Ôbelow-the-beltÕ comments remarking on 
the authorÕs (homo)sexuality, play FarmVille rather than debate about issues, and Ð during 
the elections Ð support the Ôabsolutely wrongÕ (that is, non-elite) candidates such as the 
dark-skinned, populist vice-presidential candidate Jejomar Binay. 
Online sites then are not completely productive spaces for political discussions; nor are 
they perfectly desirable spaces for social interaction.But they are nonetheless considered 
to be better alternatives than face-to-face diasporic gatherings. Here at least, people can 
talk and disagree in ways that are perceived to be more manageable than face-to-face 
gatherings. As elite migrants are typically very passionate about their political views and 
loyalties to particular politicians, they Þnd it easier to disclose and discuss these in their 
online networks rather than face-to-face, where it is more difÞcult to predict peopleÕs 
backgrounds and beliefs. And Þnally, one respondent who was able to have his political 
blog picked up by a mainstream news website expressed the hope that his political 
writings could actually have a signiÞcant impact on local debate, even though he was 
physically distant from the centre of action. 
While mediated political participation seems to be beneÞcial for elite migrantsÕ opinion 
formation and dissemination, when it comes to more action-oriented forms of participation, 
online platforms reveal their constraints and limitations. Jericho, for one, observes how 
online group- initiated fundraisers for Philippine calamities rarely receive replies and 
solicitations from others, as Filipinos still prefer the face-to-face when it comes to monetary 
transactions (but see Longboan, this issue, for a counter-example). He also remembers 
how a group of LSE and UCL Filipinos tried to organize a protest on behalf of OFWs when 
the UK Home Secretary was to deliver a keynote lecture. ÔWe did email blasts online 
inviting Filipino students from all over the UK to come down to London. But when we 
started assigning people to do banners and posters or bring food and drinks, people 
stopped replying.Õ The protest was in the end cancelled, with Jericho bringing three close 
friends to attend the talk with him. Although there are clearly instances in which online 
platforms do facilitate forms of political action Ð as evident in the recent student protests in 
the UK Ð the case presented here is a useful reminder that online interactions may also 
offer opportunities to disengage and can complicate decision making and control (Bennett, 
2003). 
At the same time, we observe that, for the most part, elite migrantsÕ discussions of political 
issues remain targeted at like-minded peers and authority Þgures. Except for one 
respondent who managed to obtain mainstream media publicity for his blog, most of our 
elite migrants target their communications at their local communities, work colleagues and 
university friends. Even though online forums are ÔsaferÕ spaces in which to interact with 
people beyond their social circles Ð be they economic elite or the intellectual elite, Ôold richÕ 
or Ônew richÕ Ð instances of cross-class mediated interaction are recalled with similar 
cringe-worthy effects to shameful face-to-face faux pas in diasporic gatherings. The media 
in this sense do not radically transform the political practices of elite migrants in the sense 
that they alter or change them; the media instead simply sustain their penchant for political 
talk and maintain the rigid class boundaries as to who belongs to these spheres of political 
discussion. 
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Hierarchy of migrants and divided mediated nationalisms 
This study on the mediated public connection of Filipino elite migrants in London has 
illustrated the diversity of the Filipino migrant experience, the signiÞcant role the media 
play in the context of migration, and the contentious meanings of nationalism that underpin 
migrant practices of political engagement. Extending the framework of public connection to 
a transnational context emphasizes migrantsÕ negotiation of the multiple public spheres 
with which they engage and disengage. At the same time, it allows us to reßect on 
migration as not simply a social, cultural or economic concern, but also as an important 
political concern. Based on our interviews and participant observation with Filipino elite 
migrants, we argue that their mediated public connection is inscribed in a socio-historical Ð 
and fundamentally classed Ð framework of nationalism and political engagement. These 
meanings and practices of nationalism inform their speciÞc kind of public connection: one 
that is engaged with political issues, but not immersed with ÔotherÕ Filipino people. 
The Þrst aspect of their mediated public connection is their expressed duty eventually to 
return to the homeland. Contrary to assumptions of elite migrants becoming 
cosmopolitanized in their travels and subsequently orienting themselves to the host rather 
than the home public, these elite migrants instead sustain their interest in homeland issues 
through skilful use of the media. Through the Internet, they keep abreast of major 
developments in the homeland and seek out news that enables them to plan ahead and 
make decisions for their eventual return. While they express this endgame of physical 
return to the homeland as a moral duty to their country, we argue that this return is also 
inßuenced by the fact that they have a wealth of opportunities for advancement and 
leadership waiting for them at home. Just like the ilustrados of the 1800s who returned 
from their studies in Europe to desirable positions of status and leadership, these elite 
migrants also expect to take on new responsibilities when they return. In fact, they view 
their return as the very fulÞlment of their debt and obligation to the homeland: by physically 
being at home, they are able directly to transmute through their bodies the ideas, talents 
and skills absent in a deprived and depleted Philippine society. Crucially, this inquiry to 
elite migrantsÕ reßection of their nationalist duties demystiÞes for us a widely unspoken and 
unquestioned hierarchy of migrant bodies. Popular and academic discourse tends to elide 
the heterogeneity of the Filipino migrant experience, as we tend to ÔmisrecognizeÕ one 
migrant for the other. Here however, we vividly see how migrant bodies are differently 
valued in the expected nationalist duties they are expected to carry out: to be good 
Filipinos, elite migrants should come home, balikbayans should intermittently come home, 
and OFWs are of greater value when they are away from home. 
The second aspect of this mediated Ôlong-distance nationalismÕ is a belief in the 
transformative power of ideas. As overseas students, they place special signiÞcance on 
the value of education. Ideas and best practices that they learn from esteemed academic 
institutions in the UK are seen as means by which they could help, develop, even save, a 
home- land that they recognize, as others do, as a damaged democracy, the sick man of 
Asia and a Ôculture of disasterÕ (Bankoff, 2003). They have a self-belief that in the future 
they could be agents of positive change in Philippine society by applying what they have 
learned in the West to their communities and companies back home. There are traces of 
this valuation of education among the ilustrados as well. The ÔFirst FilipinoÕ Jose Rizal 
(1882 [1933], pp 253Ð254) himself wrote, ÔWhat a revolution takes place in the ideas of the 
man who for the Þrst time leaves his native land and travels around through different 
countries!. . . By this means a wise traveler carries to his own country the good usages he 
has seen and tries to apply them there with the necessary modiÞcations.Õ Like the 
ilustrados who were users of homeland- oriented news media and producers of homeland-
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oriented books and periodicals, the media play an equally important role in elite migrantsÕ 
political education: they use various news websites and social network- ing sites actively to 
seek out homeland news and communicate their ideas to their peers. Similar to the 
ilustrados, who strategically fashioned themselves as more intelligent, progressive and 
advanced than native Filipinos such as Igorots (Aguilar, 2005, p 614), these elite migrants 
also reproduce distinctions between themselves as better thinkers and leaders as against 
most other Filipinos back home Ð Filipinos who very probably have no opportunity to 
access intellectual capital that they could convert into valuable political and economic 
capital. 
The third and Þnal aspect of elite migrantsÕ public connection refers to their actual practices 
of political engagement, one that we describe as engaged, but not immersed. Elite 
migrants engage in multiple forms of political talk and discussion, while at the same time 
keeping a Ôproper distanceÕ from the people they meet in formal organizations and social 
activities in the context of diaspora. These diasporic encounters are qualitatively different 
from what they have been used to back home, where boundaries between people of 
different social groups in society are more rigidly observed. In the diaspora, where people 
from different classes share common spaces as fellow students and fellow Filipinos, 
Ôsizing-upÕ rituals based on assertions of various intellectual, economic, social and cultural 
capital more often create divisions rather than forge connections. Mediated spaces such 
as Facebook, Twitter, online forums and mailing lists become the preferred venues for 
political discussion and socializing, as they tend to reduce the anxieties of face-to-face 
encounters. However, that online political activity very rarely translates into ofßine 
mobilization. In that respect, contemporary Filipino scholars in London are signiÞcantly 
different from the ilustrados of old, or the intellectual elite of other developing countries (for 
example, see Matar, 2006). Rather than the media being used to forge alliances and 
mobilize collective political action in diasporic public spaces, for this group of migrants the 
media are used to reinforce socio-cultural divides among the many different divisions that 
elite migrants faith- fully observe: Ôold richÕ/Ônew richÕ, ÔscholarshipÕ/ÔpayingÕ, ÔeliteÕ/ 
ÔbalikbayanÕ/ÔOFWÕ, ÔclassÕ/ÔjejemonÕ, Ôelite migrantÕ/Ôlocal scholarÕ, ÔManilaÕ/ÔprovinceÕ, etc. 
In sum, although the media may fan the ßames of nationalist identiÞcation, they douse the 
ßames of civic nationalism by allowing them both to disconnect easily from and disregard 
threatening and undesirable others, and at times to retreat completely from the public 
realm. For elite migrants to have a truly transformative political impact, what is required is 
not just that they should develop better uses of new media for political engagement, but 
rather that they should Þnd new ways to mediate, rather than exacerbate, long-existing 
political, economic, social and cultural divisions in Philippine society. 
1 Considered to be the Þrst among these equals is Jose Rizal, who has the distinction of being the national 
hero of the Philippines. Guerrero (1963) calls him the ÔFirst FilipinoÕ, arguing that the concept of the Filipino 
and the Filipino nation only became clearly articulated through RizalÕs writings, which subsequently inspired 
the efforts of his fellow ilustrados in the Propaganda Movement and revolutionary leaders in the homeland. 
2 In selecting our respondents, we came up with several drafting criteria. First, all of the 20 participants were 
supposed to be students between the ages of 18 and 30, with 10 participants in London and 10 in Manila. 
Other than these basics, the London- based informants also had to satisfy the criteria of: (1) at least three 
months of residence in London at the time of the interview, and (2) possession of a student visa on a 
Philippine passport. This would eliminate informants who might have actually grown up in the UK, though of 
Filipino descent. Interviews with our respondents lasted for at least an hour. In the UK, the researchers 
conducted additional participant observation in various student- and OFW-led social and political gatherings. 
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3 Chevening scholarships are perhaps the most prestigious scholarships for study in the UK. Around three to 
eight scholars are awarded (by the British Embassy in Manila) full-cost scholarships for MasterÕs studies in 
any Þeld in the UK. Chevening schol- ars are supposedly given Ôspecial treatmentÕ by the Filipino Embassy in 
London, to the annoyance of other students Ð whether ÔscholarshipÕ or ÔpayingÕ. 
4 As Amrith and Benedicto argue, nurses occupy a liminal category in between the low-status OFW category 
and the high-skilled (elite) migrant category. 
5 Interestingly, jejemon as a term coalesced in online spaces and was taken up by mainstream media in the 
months leading up to the May 2010 election Ð an election also fought along signiÞcantly classed lines, with 
Ôold richÕ eventual president Noynoy Aquino competing against candidates Joseph Estrada and Manny Villar, 
both of whom claimed that their (alleged) experiences of growing up poor enabled them to sympathize better 
with the masses. We suspect that the circulation of class-conßict discourses in the political sphere provided 
an impetus for strategies of class differentiation to be produced and reproduced in other arenas of public 
culture, including online spaces. 
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